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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case implicates the Speech or Debate Clause of 
the United States Constitution.1  The Government obtained a 
search warrant to search the email account of Chaka Fattah, a 
United States Congressman.  Fattah, along with the 
“Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House 
of Representatives” (as amicus curiae), challenged the 
unexecuted search warrant in the District Court primarily on 
Speech or Debate Clause grounds.  Fattah now appeals the 
District Court’s order denying his motion to invalidate the 
unexecuted search warrant.  Because an unexecuted search 
warrant is not separate from the merits of the case and is 
reviewable on appeal, if a defendant is convicted, it does not 
qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine.  
Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review this unexecuted 
search warrant and we dismiss Fattah’s claims under the 
Speech or Debate Clause. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
A. The Search Warrant 
 
                                              
1 The Speech or Debate Clause provides that, “for any Speech 
or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] 
shall not be questioned in any other Place.”  U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 6, cl. 1. 
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 Fattah is the subject of a federal grand jury 
investigation pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.2  
The Department of Justice, the United States Attorney’s 
Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Internal Revenue Service are 
leading the investigation, which centers on whether Fattah 
violated federal criminal laws relating to fraud, extortion, and 
bribery.   
 
 Fattah maintains an email account hosted by Google, 
Inc., known as “Gmail.”  Google acts as a repository, 
collecting emails sent and received by Gmail account holders 
like Fattah.  Fattah uses this Gmail account for personal 
matters, but he also uses it for official business relating to his 
congressional duties.3  For example, Fattah asserts that he 
uses his Gmail account to “communicat[e] with members of 
Congress regarding legislative matters”; to email “the 
schedule and agendas for House Committee meetings and 
related congressional sessions”; and to communicate “with 
[his] staff regarding legislative matters and discussions and 
documents directly relating to proposed legislative matters.”4  
Likewise, Fattah claims that he uses his Gmail account to 
engage in privileged attorney-client communications with his 
legal counsel.   
 
                                              
2 Fattah was indicted by a grand jury on July 29, 2015. 
3 Each Member of the House of Representatives has an 
official email account.  Presently, there is no policy in place 
mandating that Members solely utilize the official account to 
conduct business. [Tr. 28: 18-22].  
4 Gov’t Supp. App. 15. 
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 In February 2014, the Government served Fattah with 
a grand jury subpoena seeking various documents, including 
electronic data from his Gmail account.  In response, Fattah 
turned over some emails but objected to others on the bases of 
the Speech or Debate Clause, overbreadth, and relevance.  
Several months later, a magistrate judge issued a search 
warrant authorizing the FBI to search Fattah’s Gmail account.  
The warrant sought essentially the same information as the 
grand jury subpoena.  Specifically, the search warrant 
requested: “For the period of January 1, 2008, through the 
present, concerning Google account 
[ChakaFattah@gmail.com], all items which constitute 
evidence of a criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, 
1951, and 201.”5     
 
 Pursuant to Google policy, Fattah received an email 
from Google on June 18, 2014, stating that it had received a 
search warrant from the Government seeking electronic data 
from his account.  Google explained that it would withhold 
the documents for seven calendar days, allowing Fattah time 
to object to the request in a court of competent jurisdiction.  
Fattah filed a motion to intervene and to quash the search 
warrant in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, arguing that 
the warrant’s execution would violate the attorney-client 
privilege and work-product doctrine, the Fourth Amendment, 
and the Speech or Debate Clause.  
  
B. The District Court Opinion 
 
 The District Court granted Fattah’s motion to intervene 
but denied his motion to quash the search warrant.  The Court 
                                              
5 Gov’t Supp. App. 11. 
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held that the execution of the warrant would not imperil the 
attorney-client privilege or the protection afforded by the 
work-product doctrine because the Government had 
suggested adequate review procedures, which entailed the use 
of a “taint team” to review for privileged documents.   
 
 Fattah argued that the warrant and affidavit did not 
make out probable cause and that the warrant was general and 
overbroad.  The Court disagreed and additionally noted the 
odd procedural posture of the case, observing that Fattah 
“ha[d] cited no reported decision” supporting his contention 
that he may raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a warrant 
prior to its execution.6  The Court explained that the proper 
remedy for an improvident search warrant is a suppression 
hearing.   
 
 Likewise, the District Court rejected Fattah’s argument 
that the warrant would violate the Speech or Debate Clause.  
The Court reiterated this Circuit’s standard that the Speech or 
Debate Clause secures a privilege of non-use, rather than of 
non-disclosure.  The Court explained that “even if [Fattah’s] 
private emails include a number of privileged documents, the 
mere disclosure of those documents [would] not impugn the 
Speech or Debate Clause.”7   
    
 In the alternative to quashing the search warrant, the 
House requested that the Court modify the warrant and allow 
Fattah access to the requested records.  Denying the House’s 
request, the Court opined that “creating special protections for 
a Congressman’s private email account would encourage 
                                              
6 App. 12. 
7 App. 14. 
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corrupt legislators and their aides to make incriminating 
communications through private emails, knowing that they 
will be disclosed only with the author’s approval.”8    
  
 Fattah also fashioned his motion as a Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41(g) motion, a request for return of 
property.  Fattah argued that the Government was in 
“constructive possession” of his property.  The District Court 
denied this motion as well, explaining that because the 
Government has neither actual nor constructive possession, 
Rule 41(g) affords him no legitimate basis for relief.   
 
 Following the District Court’s rulings, Fattah filed a 
notice of appeal to this Court from the District Court’s order 
denying the motion to quash the unexecuted search warrant.  
On the same day, Fattah filed a motion to stay the order 
pending appeal.  The District Court held a hearing on the 
motion to stay and subsequently denied the motion.  
Thereafter, we granted Fattah’s motion for a status quo order 
and for a stay of the District Court’s order pending appeal.  
  
II. Discussion 
 
 Although Fattah presents several issues on appeal, we 
limit our discussion solely to jurisdiction and the proposed 
filtering procedures.  Fattah proffers three bases for appellate 
jurisdiction: (1) the collateral order doctrine, (2) the Perlman 
doctrine, and (3) Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g).  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we lack 
jurisdiction to consider Fattah’s Speech or Debate Clause 
                                              
8 App. 16.   
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claims, but take jurisdiction with respect to his claims 
regarding the filtering procedures.9 
A. The Collateral Order Doctrine 
 
 Fattah first contends that under the collateral order 
doctrine, we have appellate jurisdiction.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291, an immediate appeal may be taken from any final 
decision of the district court.  “Although ‘final decisions’ 
typically are ones that trigger the entry of judgment, they also 
include a small set of prejudgment orders that are ‘collateral 
to’ the merits of an action and ‘too important’ to be denied 
immediate review.”10  Under the collateral order doctrine, 
however, a prejudgment order is immediately appealable if it: 
(1) conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) 
                                              
9 The House also suggests that jurisdiction to hear Fattah’s 
claims may lie under the All Writs Act, as a petition for 
mandamus.  Fattah, however, has not sought mandamus 
relief.  Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, 
available only where (1) there is “‘no other adequate means to 
attain the relief sought;’” (2) the right to issuance of the writ 
is “‘clear and indisputable;’” and (3) the issuing court is 
“satisfied that ‘the writ is appropriate under the 
circumstances.’”  In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 
383, 399 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 
212 (3d Cir. 2006)).  As previously stated, Fattah has the right 
to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress if he is convicted.  
Because Fattah has an adequate remedy in a suppression 
hearing following execution of the warrant, we decline to 
grant jurisdiction under this ground.   
10 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 
(2009) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 
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resolves an important issue completely separate from the 
merits of the case; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.11  A litigant must satisfy all 
three requirements to succeed under the collateral order 
doctrine.  We narrowly construe this exception, taking into 
account that “a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be 
deferred until final judgment has been entered, in which 
claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation may 
be ventilated.”12   
 
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has noted that 
application of the collateral order doctrine involves a 
categorical inquiry and “[a]s long as the class of claims, taken 
as a whole, can be adequately vindicated by other means, the 
chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a 
particular injustice averted, does not provide a basis for 
jurisdiction under § 1291.”13  The Court emphasized, “[t]he 
crucial question . . . is not whether an interest is important in 
the abstract; it is whether deferring review until final 
judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the cost of 
allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant 
orders.”14   
 
 Fattah appeals from the District Court’s order denying 
a motion to quash an unexecuted search warrant on Speech or 
Debate Clause grounds.  He relies on our decision in United 
                                              
11 Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 
867 (1994). 
12 Id. at 868. 
13 Mohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 107 (internal quotation 
marks and alterations omitted). 
14 Id. at 108. 
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States v. McDade where we held that we had jurisdiction to 
entertain an appeal regarding a motion to dismiss an 
indictment under the Speech or Debate Clause.15  Fattah cites 
to our language in McDade stating, “[w]e also have 
jurisdiction to review any of the district court’s other rulings 
regarding the Speech or Debate Clause that satisfy all of the 
requirements of the collateral order doctrine.”16  Notably, we 
followed this statement with the caveat that “[o]ur 
jurisdiction, however, extends no further,” recognizing the 
limits of the collateral order doctrine.17  McDade, however, is 
inapplicable because Fattah’s claim under the collateral order 
doctrine falters.  We review each requirement below.   
 
1. The first prong of the collateral order doctrine 
requires us to determine whether the District Court’s order 
conclusively determines the disputed issue.  Fattah satisfies 
the first prong of the test.  His motion to quash raised the 
issue of whether the search warrant could be executed, and 
the District Court conclusively answered that question in the 
affirmative.  Thus, the order conclusively determined the 
disputed issue.  Fattah, however, fails to satisfy either the 
second or third prongs, dooming his argument.   
 
2. The second inquiry of the collateral order doctrine 
asks whether the District Court’s order resolves an important 
question completely separate from the merits.  Fattah argues 
that the Speech or Debate Clause issues are “extremely 
important issues” that are separate from the merits of the case.  
He contends that because no indictment has been returned, 
                                              
15 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994). 
16 Id. at 288. 
17 Id. 
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the issue is separate from the merits because there is no 
“underlying action.”  He is incorrect. 
 
 The Supreme Court has defined an “important issue” 
as “one involving interests that are ‘weightier than the 
societal interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final 
judgment principles’ or one that is ‘serious and unsettled.’”18  
Moreover, “an issue is important if the interests that would 
potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate 
review are significant relative to efficiency interests sought to 
be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.”19  
Here, Fattah contends that the Speech or Debate privilege is 
one of non-disclosure and that “[t]he district court’s ruling is 
one of important constitutional dimensions broader in scope 
than just the interest of an individual Congressman, being ‘of 
great institutional interest to the House as a whole.’”20     
 
 Fattah’s argument, however, misconstrues the term 
“important.”  We have held that, “[t]he type of ‘important 
issue[s]’ that the ‘completely separate from the merits’ 
requirement encompasses are those that are important in a 
jurisprudential sense.’”21  First, as we have previously said, 
                                              
18 United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 879; Cohen, 337 
U.S. at 547). 
19 Pierce v. Blaine, 467 F.3d 362, 370-71 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
20 Appellant’s Br. 25 (quoting In re Grand Jury (Eilberg), 
587 F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
21 Praxis Props., Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 947 F.2d 
49, 54 (3d Cir. 1981) (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Nemours Found. v. Manganaro Corp., New England, 878 
12 
 
the Speech or Debate privilege, as applied to records, is one 
of non-use versus non-disclosure.  That is, while the privilege 
prohibits evidentiary “use” of records, it does not prohibit 
disclosure of records to the Government in the course of an 
investigation.  Thus, the issue is not unsettled—indeed, this 
Court has decisively settled the issue in a manner that 
forecloses Fattah’s argument.22        
 
 Second, in addition to failing to raise an important 
issue, we believe Fattah’s claim is not completely separate 
from the merits.  The requirements for collateral appeal are 
particularly “stringent” in the criminal context because “‘the 
delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal,’ 
which the rule is designed to avoid, ‘are especially inimical to 
the effective and fair administration of the criminal law.’”23  
Indeed, the only orders that have been held to fall within the 
collateral order doctrine in a criminal action are: orders 
denying motions to reduce bail; orders denying motions to 
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds; orders denying 
immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause; and orders 
                                                                                                     
F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
22 See United States v. Helstoski, 635 F.2d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 
1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Eilberg), 587 F.2d at 
597; In re Grand Jury (Cianfrani), 563 F.2d 577, 584 (3d Cir. 
1977). 
23 Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977) (quoting 
Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962)). 
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directing defendants to be medicated against their will to 
render them competent to stand trial.24     
 
 Unlike these orders, which “finally resolve issues that 
are separate from guilt or innocence,”25 a motion to suppress 
an unexecuted search warrant may substantially affect the 
merits of the case.  We have held that “a pretrial ruling on a 
suppression motion is not a collateral order under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 because the motion ‘presents an issue that is involved in 
and will be part of a criminal prosecution in process at the 
time the order is issued.’”26  The same is true of a motion to 
quash a warrant.  The fruits of a search warrant may become 
part of the criminal prosecution.  In most cases, the fruits 
become part of the evidentiary chain of proof.  Therefore, an 
order denying a motion to quash an unexecuted search 
warrant stands in stark contrast to the orders previously 
mentioned, which, for example, challenge the very authority 
of the Government to prosecute a defendant.27  Accordingly, 
                                              
24 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951); Abney, 431 U.S. at 
659; Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506–08 (1979); Sell 
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003). 
25 Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 266 (1984). 
26 United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 347, 355 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Di Bella, 369 U.S. at 127). 
27 See, e.g., Abney, 431 U.S. at 659 (explaining that “the very 
nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that it is collateral 
to, and separable from the principal issue at the accused’s 
impending criminal trial, i.e., whether or not the accused is 
guilty of the offense charged” and instead the claim 
“contest[s] the very authority of the Government to hale him 
into court to face trial on the charge against him”). 
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Fattah fails to satisfy this requirement of the collateral order 
doctrine. 
 
3. The third prong of the collateral order doctrine 
focuses on whether the District Court’s order is effectively 
unreviewable on appeal.  Fattah asserts that the District 
Court’s order leaves him with no remedy since it does not 
limit the Government’s access to or use of Speech or Debate 
Clause documents.  First, this argument relies on Fattah’s 
misconception that the Speech or Debate Clause provides a 
privilege of non-disclosure.  Instead, as we discuss further 
below, because we have held that it is a privilege of non-use 
when applied to documents, the Government is not prohibited 
from accessing the documents.  In addition, his argument is 
plainly belied by our own precedent.  In In re Solomon, we 
denied a defendant’s motion to suppress an unexecuted search 
warrant, holding that the defendant had other available 
remedies.28  We explained that the motion to suppress the 
search warrant was not effectively unreviewable because the 
defendant could move to suppress the evidence, and “[i]f that 
motion is denied, and if [he] is convicted, the denial of the 
motion to suppress may then be asserted as a ground for 
appeal from the final judgment.”29  The same is true here.   
 
 Our binding precedent requires us to narrowly 
circumscribe the contours of the collateral order doctrine.  
And, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, “although the 
Court has been asked many times to expand the ‘small class’ 
of collaterally appealable orders, we have instead kept it 
                                              
28 465 F.3d 114, 122-23 (3d Cir. 2006). 
29 Id. at 122. 
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narrow and selective in its membership.”30  As such, we 
decline Fattah’s invitation to expand this discerning 
membership to motions to quash unexecuted search warrants.  
Because Fattah’s claim is not completely separate from the 
merits and is reviewable upon appeal, the collateral order 
doctrine is unavailing as a basis for appellate jurisdiction.  We 
therefore lack jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine 
to entertain this appeal.   
 
B. The Perlman Doctrine 
 1. The Perlman Doctrine Does Not Provide 
Jurisdiction for Fattah’s Speech or Debate Clause 
Claims. 
Fattah’s claims regarding the Speech or Debate Clause 
fare no better under the so-called Perlman doctrine.  The 
Perlman doctrine refers to the legal principle that a discovery 
order aimed at a third party may be immediately appealed on 
the theory that the third party will not risk contempt by 
refusing to comply.31  Disclosure orders are not final orders 
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Rather, “[t]o obtain 
immediate appellate review, a privilege holder must disobey 
the court’s order, be held in contempt, and then appeal the 
contempt order,” which is considered a final order.32  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Perlman v. United States 
established an exception when the traditional contempt route 
is unavailable because the privileged information is controlled 
by a disinterested third party who is likely to comply with the 
                                              
30 Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349-50 (2006). 
31 As previously noted, Google, as custodian of the records at 
issue, is the third party in this case. 
32 In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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request rather than be held in contempt for the sake of an 
immediate appeal.33  In these circumstances, a litigant 
asserting a legally cognizable privilege may timely appeal an 
adverse disclosure order.  The reasoning behind Perlman lies 
in the inequity of leaving a privilege-holder “powerless to 
avert the mischief of the order,” and forcing him to “accept its 
incidence and seek a remedy at some other time and in some 
other way.”34  Moreover, Perlman “reflected concern that 
where the subject of the discovery order (characteristically 
the custodian of documents) and the holder of a privilege are 
different, the custodian might yield up the documents rather 
than face the hazards of contempt, and would thereby destroy 
the privilege.”35  The question we address today is whether 
Perlman should apply even where Fattah fails to cite a legally 
cognizable privilege.  
 
 Fattah argues that the Speech or Debate Clause 
precludes execution of the search warrant.  He contends that 
the privilege is one of non-disclosure and that the search 
warrant was served on Google, which “is a disinterested third 
party which is not likely to permit itself to be placed in 
contempt” on his behalf.36  As such, he asserts that his is the 
paradigmatic Perlman case, and that he is entitled to 
immediately appeal the District Court’s order.  We disagree.   
  
                                              
33 247 U.S. 7, 12-13 (1918). 
34 Id. at 13. 
35 In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 83, 90 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 337, 340 
(D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
36 Appellant’s Br. at 28-29. 
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 Fattah urges that our decision in In re Grand Jury is 
instructive.37  There, the Government moved to compel a law 
firm to provide documentation regarding its representation of 
a corporation that was the subject of a federal criminal 
investigation.  The corporation objected to the subpoenas 
served upon the law firm, but the district court granted the 
Government’s motions to enforce.  The corporation sought an 
immediate appeal under the Perlman doctrine predicated on 
the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.  We 
held that the corporation was entitled to immediately appeal 
the adverse disclosure order to protect those privileges.38   
 
 In this case, there is an important distinction to be 
drawn: Fattah fails to cite a legally cognizable privilege.  
Indeed, Fattah relies heavily on our case law discussing the 
Perlman doctrine in the attorney-client privilege context.39  
                                              
37 705 F.3d at 133. 
38 Id. at 149. 
39 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 745 F.3d 681, 686-87 
(3d Cir. 2014) (permitting a client and corporation to 
intervene and quash a subpoena directed to their attorney for 
testimony under the Perlman doctrine on the basis of the 
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine); In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 800-01 
(3d Cir. 1979) (permitting a corporation to intervene and 
immediately appeal an adverse disclosure order to protect the 
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine).  The 
only case Fattah cites to applying the Perlman doctrine in the 
context of the Speech or Debate clause is In re Grand Jury 
(Cianfrani), 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).  That case, 
however, is distinguishable.  First, the case involved a state 
senator who was charged in a federal prosecution.  We 
18 
 
He fails to cite any precedent discussing Perlman’s 
applicability to the Speech or Debate Clause.40  The Speech 
or Debate Clause encompasses three main protections, it: (1) 
bars civil and criminal liability for “legislative acts”;41 (2) 
                                                                                                     
ultimately held that neither the state nor federal Speech or 
Debate Clause privileges extended in such a case.  Id. at 580-
82.  Second, the case involved a subpoena versus an 
unexecuted search warrant.  A subpoena, of course, may be 
challenged prior to compliance.  In stark contrast, a search 
warrant is properly challenged after it is executed.  
Accordingly, In re Grand Jury (Cianfrani) is of limited utility 
to Fattah.       
40 For its part, the House of Representatives as amicus insists 
that Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), is “on all 
fours.”  House Br. 22.  We disagree.  In Gravel, a Senator 
moved to prevent the questioning of his aide in a grand jury 
proceeding.  The Court held that the privilege established by 
the Speech or Debate Clause that prevents the questioning of 
a Member of Congress regarding legislative acts likewise bars 
the questioning of a Member’s aide regarding actions which 
would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if 
performed by the Member personally.  The Court, however, 
did not squarely address the Perlman issue.  Id. at 608, n.1 
(“The Court of Appeals, United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 
756-757 (CA1 1972), held that because the subpoena was 
directed to third parties, who could not be counted on to risk 
contempt to protect intervenor's rights, Gravel might be 
‘powerless to avert the mischief of the order’ if not permitted 
to appeal, citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13, 38 
S. Ct. 417, 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918).  The United States does not 
here challenge the propriety of the appeal.”).   
41 Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1973). 
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guarantees that a Member, or his alter ego, may not be made 
to answer questions about his legislative acts;42 and (3) bars 
the use of legislative-act evidence against a Member.43  Here, 
we address the evidentiary privilege as applied to records.   
 
 While courts have recognized that the bounds of these 
protections vary, they are all rooted in the notion that, “to the 
extent that the Speech or Debate Clause creates a Testimonial 
privilege as well as a Use immunity, it does so only for the 
purpose of protecting the legislator and those intimately 
associated with him in the legislative process from the 
harassment of hostile questioning.”44  Courts have interpreted 
the term “questioning” broadly to forbid submission of 
legislative act evidence to a jury—whether in the form of 
testimony or records.45   
 
 It cannot be, however, that the privilege prohibits 
disclosure of evidentiary records to the Government during 
the course of an investigation.  In re Grand Jury (Eilberg) 
provides a good example.  There we held that the disclosure 
of telephone records containing Speech or Debate Clause 
                                              
42 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616. 
43 United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487 (1979). 
44 In re Grand Jury (Eilberg), 587 F.2d at 597. 
45 United States v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 746 (9th Cir. 2014), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 14-1082 (Mar. 9, 2015) (“Evident 
from its plain language, the focus is on the improper 
questioning of a Congressman. As such, the Clause is violated 
when the government reveals legislative act information to a 
jury because this would subject a Member to being 
‘questioned’ in a place other than the House or the Senate.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
20 
 
privileged documents was permissible.46  Moreover, we 
explained that the evidentiary privilege “[was] not designed 
to encourage confidences by maintaining secrecy, for the 
legislative process in a democracy has only a limited 
toleration for secrecy.”47   
 
 This makes good sense.  If it were any other way, 
investigations into corrupt Members could be easily avoided 
by mere assertion of this privilege.  Members could, in effect, 
shield themselves fully from criminal investigations by 
simply citing to the Speech or Debate Clause.  We do not 
believe the Speech or Debate Clause was meant to effectuate 
such deception.  Rather, the “purpose of the Speech or Debate 
Clause is to protect the individual legislator, not simply for 
his own sake, but to preserve the independence and thereby 
the integrity of the legislative process.”48  That is, the Clause 
was meant to free “the legislator from the executive and 
judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control his 
conduct as a legislator.”49  The crux of the Clause is to 
“prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability [for 
legislative acts] before a possibly hostile judiciary.”50  It is 
clear that the purpose, however, has never been to shelter a 
Member from potential criminal responsibility. 
                                              
46 In re Grand Jury (Eilberg), 587 F.2d at 597. 
47 Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. 1 § 5, cl. 3). 
48 United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524-25 
(1972)). 
49 Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 492 (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 
618). 
50 Id. at 491 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 
181 (1966)). 
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 Any other reading of this privilege would eradicate the 
integrity of the legislative process and unduly amplify the 
protections to the individual Member.  Indeed, “financial 
abuses by way of bribes, perhaps even more than Executive 
power, would gravely undermine legislative integrity and 
defeat the right of the public to honest representation. 
Depriving the Executive of the power to investigate and 
prosecute and the Judiciary of the power to punish bribery of 
Members of Congress is unlikely to enhance legislative 
independence.”51  We decline to strip the legislative process, 
and the public, of this protection. 
 
Accordingly, while the Speech or Debate Clause 
prohibits hostile questioning regarding legislative acts in the 
form of testimony to a jury, it does not prohibit disclosure of 
Speech or Debate Clause privileged documents to the 
Government.  Instead, as we have held before, it merely 
prohibits the evidentiary submission and use of those 
documents.     
   
 Thus, based on these distinctions, we hold that the 
Perlman doctrine does not apply to the Speech or Debate 
Clause with respect to records disclosed to the Government in 
the course of an investigation.  The Speech or Debate Clause 
does not prohibit the disclosure of privileged documents.  
Rather, it forbids the evidentiary use of such documents.  As 
such, there is no “mischief” for Fattah to stymy as there is no 
privilege in danger of destruction.  Fattah is unable to 
challenge the disclosure regardless of to whom the request is 
                                              
51 Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036 (emphasis in the original) (quoting 
Brewster, 408 U.S. at 524–25). 
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made.  This differs from a challenge to a subpoena requesting 
attorney-client privileged documents, where, as the saying 
goes, you cannot “unring the bell.”  In that scenario, no 
remedy assuages disclosure and the privilege may very well 
be destroyed.  Fattah’s challenge is far less serious and 
therefore should not receive such protections.  There is no 
bell to unring here—the privileged documents may be 
disclosed without violating the privilege, and Fattah may 
avail himself of several remedies to any alleged illegal search 
or seizure.     
     
The impetus of the Perlman doctrine is to protect 
privilege holders from the disclosure of privileged materials 
by a disinterested third-party.  Here, Fattah fails to cite a 
legally cognizable privilege to support his claim.  
Accordingly, Perlman is inapplicable, and we hold that we 
lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal under this ground as 
well.  
2. The Perlman Doctrine Provides Jurisdiction to 
Review Fattah’s Claims Under the Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine.  
Fattah contends that the Perlman doctrine provides 
appellate jurisdiction for this Court to review the merits of his 
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine claims 
regarding inadequate filtering procedures.  We agree.  Unlike 
Fattah’s Speech or Debate Clause claim, this claim succeeds 
because it is predicated on legally cognizable privileges 
continuously recognized under the Perlman Doctrine.52  
Because the attorney-client privilege and work-product 
                                              
52 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 745 F.3d at 686. 
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doctrine are non-disclosure privileges that may in fact be 
destroyed by a disinterested third-party, Perlman applies.   
On the merits of this issue, Fattah argues that the 
District Court erred in approving the Government’s proposed 
filtering procedures regarding documents protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.  These 
procedures involved the use of a “taint team” to review for 
privileged documents, a common tool employed by the 
Government.53  The team, however, is structured to include a 
non-attorney federal agent at the first level of review, 
followed by review by independent attorney federal agents.  
Moreover, Fattah contends that he does not have the 
opportunity to assert his privilege with respect to certain 
documents deemed to be “clearly not privileged” until after 
they are turned over to those prosecuting his case. 
                                              
53 Certain courts have limited the circumstances in which 
prosecutors may employ taint teams during criminal 
investigations.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 
F.3d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 2006).  But because Fattah does not 
argue that the use of a taint team is inappropriate in his case, 
we have no occasion to consider the appropriate limits, if any, 
on their use.  Of course, a court always retains the prerogative 
to require a different method of review in any particular case, 
such as requiring the use of a special master or reviewing the 
seized documents in camera itself.  See, e.g., Klitzman, 
Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 962 (3d Cir. 
1984); Black v. United States, 172 F.R.D. 511, 516 (S.D. Fla. 
1997); United States v. Abbell, 914 F. Supp. 519, 520–21 
(S.D. Fla. 1995); In re Search Warrant for Law Offices 
Executed on Mar. 19, 1992, 153 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
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Fattah maintains that only attorneys should be 
involved in this type of privilege review and that the District 
Court did not realize a non-attorney agent would be the first 
line review.54  Thus, Fattah argues that “eliminated from the 
initial determination of what may be privileged is the only 
professional qualified to make that determination.”55  Fattah 
also argues that he should have an opportunity to work with 
prosecutors to identify privileged documents and that he 
should be entitled to a court ruling on any documents he 
claims are privileged before the filter agents turn these 
documents over to the prosecutorial arm of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ).  Because of the legal nature of the privilege 
issues involved, we agree that the first level of privilege 
review should be conducted by an independent DOJ attorney 
acceptable to the District Court.  Fattah's remaining 
arguments regarding the structure of the review process, we 
believe, are more appropriately addressed by a district court 
in the first instance on a case-by-case basis.  On remand, the 
District Court may thus, in its discretion, implement those 
procedures it deems necessary to protect Fattah’s privileges. 
                                              
54 Indeed, the District Court held that the use of “taint teams” 
had been cited with approval in this Circuit.  The cases the 
District Court cited to, however, all involved an attorney at 
the first level of review.  See, e.g., Manno v. Christie, No. 08-
cv-3254, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31470 (D.N.J., Apr. 13, 
2009).  Likewise, the District Court never explicitly 
acknowledged that review would be conducted by a non-
lawyer.  Rather, the court stated review would be conducted 
by “FBI Special Agents not involved in the investigation.”  
App. 10.    
55 Fattah Br. 61. 
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C. Fattah’s Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) 
Motion 
 
 Fattah also styled his pre-indictment motion as a 
request for relief under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41(g) and contends that under this rule we have appellate 
jurisdiction.  The Rule sets out the procedures criminal 
defendants should employ for the return of property, 
providing: 
(g) Motion to Return Property. A 
person aggrieved by an unlawful 
search and seizure of property or 
by the deprivation of property 
may move for the property's 
return. The motion must be filed 
in the district where the property 
was seized. The court must 
receive evidence on any factual 
issue necessary to decide the 
motion. If it grants the motion, the 
court must return the property to 
the movant, but may impose 
reasonable conditions to protect 
access to the property and its use 
in later proceedings. 
 Denial of a pre-indictment Rule 41(g) motion is 
immediately appealable, only if the motion is: (1) solely for 
the return of property and (2) is in no way tied to an existing 
criminal prosecution against the movant.56  In this case, the 
                                              
56 Di Bella, 369 U.S. at 131-32; see also In re Grand Jury, 
635 F.3d 101, 103-05 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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warrant has yet to be executed, and the Government has yet to 
seize the evidence Fattah seeks returned.  Therefore, there is 
no property to return.  As such, we lack appellate jurisdiction 
under this ground as well.     
III. Conclusion 
 We take seriously the sentiments and concerns of the 
Supreme Court that Members are not to be “super-citizens” 
immune from criminal liability or process.57  Permitting an 
interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion to quash an 
unexecuted search warrant based on the Speech or Debate 
Clause would set bad precedent and insulate Members from 
criminal investigations and criminal process.  This, of course, 
cannot and should not be the purpose of the Clause.  Thus, for 
all of the reasons above, we dismiss Fattah’s appeal regarding 
his Speech or Debate Clause claims for lack of jurisdiction 
and we remand to the District Court his claim with respect to 
inadequate filtering procedures. 
  
                                              
57 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516. 
In the Matter of the Search of Electronic Communications 
No.  14-3752 
_________________________________________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: 
 I agree with my colleagues that the Speech or Debate 
Clause does not confer a privilege of confidentiality.  Thus, 
the motion to quash the search warrant on that basis must be 
denied.  Any other conclusion is foreclosed by a long line of 
precedent.1  However, that Fattah’s argument lacks merit does 
not, in my view, deprive us of jurisdiction to review his claim 
under the Perlman doctrine.  “Rather, the lack of merit means 
that the claim of [privilege] should be denied for just that 
reason—it lacks merit.”  Powell v. Ridge, 247 F.3d 520, 527 
(3d Cir. 2001) (Roth, J., dissenting).  I thus respectfully 
dissent in part.  
 “When a district court orders a witness—whether a 
party to an underlying litigation, a subject or target of a grand 
jury investigation, or a complete stranger to the 
proceedings—to testify or produce documents, its order 
generally is not considered an immediately appealable ‘final 
decision[ ]’ under § 1291.”  In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d 133, 
                                              
1 Of course, our binding precedent also provides that, while 
the Government has a right to review the documents and 
argue privilege, Fattah has an equal right to participate in that 
process, particularly given “the information as to [what] were 
legislative acts is in his possession alone.”  In re Grand Jury 
Investigation (Eilberg), 587 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1978); see 
also id. (holding that a congressman asserting the Speech or 
Debate Clause privilege in a grand-jury proceeding “should 
be permitted to indicate by affidavit or testimony those calls 
which he contends are privileged”).  
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142 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original).  The appellant 
instead only secures the right to an immediate appeal when he 
defies the order, is held in contempt, and appeals the 
contempt order.  This rule, “‘though at times a harsh one,’” 
discourages “‘all but the most serious’” appeals because “[i]t 
forces the objector to weigh carefully the likelihood of 
success of its challenge” along with “the importance it 
attaches to avoiding the ordered disclosure and protecting any 
associated privileges.”  Id. at 143 (quoting In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1979)).  In effect, 
review remains available through this route even where the 
likelihood of success is low so long as the importance 
attached is high.  
 Where a disclosure order is addressed to a 
disinterested third party, however, the incentive structure 
shifts.  Unlike the holder of a privilege, a mere custodian of 
records cannot be “expected to risk a citation for contempt in 
order to secure [the privilege holder] an opportunity for 
judicial review.”  United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 
(1971).  Moreover, without a means to force the third party to 
protect the privilege holder’s rights, it is “left . . . ‘powerless 
to avert the mischief of [a disclosure] order.’”  Id. (quoting 
Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918)).  Under the 
Perlman doctrine, we allow a party opposing a discovery 
order on grounds of privilege to appeal immediately where 
the order is directed at a third party who lacks a sufficient 
stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing 
compliance.  See id. 
 The same principle applies here: As the party on which 
the warrant was served, Google could refuse to comply and 
seek appellate review through a separate proceeding for 
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contempt.2  However, it presumably has little incentive to do 
so because the asserted privilege belongs not to Google but to 
Fattah.  Moreover, without custody of the allegedly privileged 
documents, Fattah cannot himself defy the order to force an 
interlocutory appeal.  Accordingly, Fattah’s case falls 
squarely within Perlman’s rationale.   
 My colleagues of course suggest otherwise.  They 
conclude that we are without jurisdiction because there is no 
confidentiality privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause.  
But “[t]he question of the existence of a privilege . . . 
pertain[s] to the merits,” Slark v. Broom, 7 La. Ann. 337, 342 
(1852), and it is well established that “jurisdiction under the 
Perlman doctrine does not rise or fall with the merits of the 
appellant’s underlying claim for relief,” Doe No. 1 v. United 
States, 749 F.3d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 2014).  See also Ross v. 
City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 2005) 
                                              
2 To the extent the Government argues that even contempt 
proceedings are unavailable for review of an unexecuted 
search warrant issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1), this 
position is directly inconsistent with its position in a pending 
Second Circuit case.  See Brief of the United States of 
America at 8 n.5, In re Warrant To Search Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 
14-2985 (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 2005) (noting that the District 
Court’s “entry of a contempt order” gave the Second Circuit 
jurisdiction to review an unexecuted search warrant issued 
under § 2703); see also In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-
Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 
No. 13-mj-2814, 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 
2014) (Preska, C.J.).  (Interestingly, in that case the 
Government also has taken the contrary position that this type 
of search warrant isn’t really a search warrant at all.)   
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(“[Perlman] jurisdiction does not depend on the validity of 
the appellant’s underlying claims for relief.”).  Rather, “[i]t is 
the possibility of disclosure of information which is thought 
to be confidential that is central to the Perlman exception.”  
United States v. Calandra, 706 F.2d 225, 228 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(emphasis added).   
 Not only do my colleagues fail to cite any case law for 
their novel proposition that the Perlman doctrine depends on 
the cognizability of the privilege asserted, they also overlook 
numerous cases to the contrary.  This includes Perlman itself, 
where the Supreme Court reviewed the petitioner’s claims on 
interlocutory appeal despite concluding his arguments lacked 
merit.  See Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13–15.  Indeed, we have 
routinely invoked the Perlman doctrine as the basis for our 
jurisdiction, only to decide ultimately that the appellant lacks 
the privilege asserted.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Impaneled 
Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 381, 383 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(rejecting “the application of a state required reports privilege 
as a matter of federal common law” though concluding the 
appellant “had standing to intervene below and challenge the 
subpoena on the basis of his claim of privilege”); In re Grand 
Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1997) (refusing to 
recognize a cognizable “parent-child privilege” but citing 
Perlman as the basis for its jurisdiction).   
 We are not without company; other appellate courts 
have done the same.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
832 F.2d 554, 560 (11th Cir. 1987) (permitting an 
interlocutory appeal, but holding “that the privilege asserted 
by [the] appellants [was] without a basis in Florida law” and 
that they “ha[d] no privilege of nondisclosure under state 
law”); In re: a Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 
288 F.3d 289, 291, 295 (7th Cir. 2002) (invoking Perlman for 
the court’s jurisdiction though refusing to extend the attorney-
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client privilege to communications between government 
attorneys and their state clients).   
 The failure to recognize our jurisdiction under 
Perlman is particularly puzzling given that we have 
previously relied on that doctrine to review—and reject—
indistinguishable attempts to bar disclosure under the Speech 
or Debate Clause.  While my colleagues distinguish one such 
case, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Cianfrani), 563 F.2d 577 
(3d Cir. 1977), as having involved a state, rather than federal, 
congressperson, I fail to see the relevance of that distinction.  
Neither did a panel of our Court the following year when U.S. 
Congressman Eilberg intervened in grand-jury proceedings 
and appealed.  See Eilberg, 587 F.2d at 597 (concluding we 
had jurisdiction to review the interlocutory appeal, but 
holding, that, “as we ha[d] said on two other occasions, the 
[Speech or Debate] privilege when applied to records or third-
party testimony is . . . not [one] of non-disclosure” (citing 
United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978), aff’d, 
442 U.S. 477 (1979), aff’d sub nom. Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U.S. 500 (1979); Cianfrani, 563 F.3d 577)).   
 Finally, that these prior Speech or Debate Clause cases 
arose in the context of a subpoena duces tecum (rather than 
search warrant) is also an irrelevant distinction.  If the 
Perlman doctrine did not apply to search warrants, Fattah 
would similarly be unable to rely on that doctrine to appeal 
his attorney-client privilege and work-product claims.  Yet 
here my colleagues correctly rely on the Perlman doctrine to 
conclude that “this claim succeeds.”  Majority Op. 22.  
Similarly, other courts have applied Perlman even though a 
search warrant has been used.  See, e.g., In re Berkley & Co., 
629 F.2d 548, 551–52 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Perlman to 
consider the denial of a motion to prevent the Government 
from disclosing to the grand jury certain privileged 
documents it had previously seized); United States v. Griffin, 
6 
 
440 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying the Perlman 
doctrine where seized documents were in the temporary 
possession of a special master);  In re Sealed Case, 716 F.3d 
603, 612 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that if a search warrant is used to seize allegedly 
privileged documents, the order would be appealable under 
Perlman (citing Berkley, 629 F.2d 548)). 
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished 
appellate courts not to “conflate[e] the jurisdictional question 
with the merits of the appeal.”  Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 627 (2009).  I believe that, by 
intertwining the cognizability of the privilege with that of an 
appellate court’s jurisdiction, the majority contravenes this 
mandate.  I therefore respectfully dissent in part.    
